with that approach, focusing on particular features or issues about economic change ' (p. 399) . When assessing the two, they state (p. 399), signi cantly:
Of the two parts of the endeavor, we view the development of the general theoretical approach as by far the more important. The particular models are interesting in their own right, but we regard them primarily as examples of the class of models consistent with our proposed way of theorizing.
The signi cance of their book lies in the fact that it succeeds in providing an alternative to neoclassical economics by furnishing essential cues for a new 'way of theorizing'.
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS IN THE FUTURE
When assessing developments in the eld since the publication of this book, two trends warrant particular attention. First, there has been a considerable falling short in the ensuing e orts to attain the two goals. Most of the above-mentioned major publications, worthy though they are, have concentrated on devising and re ning particular models and theoretical positions, with much less e ort being devoted to the goal of constructing viable foundations for the approach. The lack of underpinning has not just left much valuable work unstructured and unrelated, it has also rendered the new discipline as a whole generally weak in terms of its competition with the mainstream. Second, there has been a growing recognition that the search for better foundations should be informed by integration rather than isolated developments along author-focused approaches based, for instance, on the works of Joseph Schumpeter, Thorstein Veblen, Friedrich Hayek or Alfred Marshall. This applies even to Schumpeter's work, which has probably contributed more to the foundations of the new approach than that of any other author (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007) . Marking the boundaries of a modern Schumpeter programme, Andreas Pyka and Horst Hanusch (2006, p. 4) note that: 'that strand of literature which is concerned with industry evolution and technological progress . . . can be coined NeoSchumpeterian economics'.
Since Nelson and Winter's work bears strong imprints of Schumpeter's thinking, what Nelson and co-author Davide Consoli have said recently when addressing the overall scope of the discipline is particularly noteworthy (Nelson and Consoli, 2010, p. 665 
):
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Many contemporary economists who consider themselves evolutionary theorists have in mind a narrower and a broader goal. The narrower goal is to meet what we will call 'Schumpeter's challenge', which is to create a theoretical framework capable of analyzing innovation-driven economic growth. While it might be suggested that this narrow goal is rather broad, the still broader goal is no less than the replacement of neoclassical theory with a theoretical alternative . . . Schumpeter's approach, which originally represented the general reference point, is now seen as a narrow approach in view of a new, broader vision of the discipline. Esben Andersen's (2008, p . 1) general assessment may mirror a view held widely in this school of thought: ' [E] volutionary economics has moved beyond Schumpeter's strand . . . and has also moved beyond Marshall and Veblen and many other pioneers'. Although the extended scope has not yet coalesced into a solid, uni ed theoretical framework, it has already been providing, as will be shown, enormously fertile ground for developing, testing and experimenting with new theoretical approaches, simulation techniques, statistical methods, ways of organizing and collecting data and mathematical representations.
NATURAL HISTORY: HIERARCHY OF EVOLVED COMPLEXITY
From a global perspective, the question is this: what makes entities speci cally economic ones, distinctively di erent from non-economic ones? Economic entities are part of a natural history that has evolved into a hierarchy of levels with di ering complexity. Although complexity scientists have variously addressed the issue of how to de ne and validate the hierarchy of evolved complexity (Lane, 2006; Holland, 1998) , few contributions have been forthcoming so far from the camp of economists, with the notable exception of John Foster (2005) . Construed in elementary terms, the natural hierarchy can be seen as being composed of physical (or physiochemical), biological and cultural levels. Signi cantly, economic entities are phenomena that, in their evolved complexity, belong to the cultural -not to the physical, biological or any other -level of complexity. To claim empirical validity, economic entities need to be portrayed in such a way that they take into account the characteristics of the level of complexity to which they belong. Economics in this way is, in a very fundamental sense, a cultural science.
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THE NATURAL SCIENCES AS A TOOLBOX
Although empirical validity is clearly of major concern for science, there is another desideratum of equal signi cance. Scienti c statements stand out over non-scienti c ones in their logical rigour, formal elegance and openness to falsi cation. To qualify for appellation as 'scienti c', a particular toolbox is required, involving analytical language, various forms of logic, mathematical representation, statistical methods and modelling techniques. In their search for an adequate toolbox, proponents of evolutionary economics have turned variously to physics and to biology. The physics-based approach to economics has bene ted much from the early work on complexity done at the Santa Fe Institute (Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur et al., 1997) . Through the application of modern physics, the work acquired the status of a new heterodox economics. The new assumptions of non-linearity, feedback, discrete parameters and iteration stood in stark contrast to the well-behaved world of mechanics that informs the neoclassical canon. These nucleic activities have developed into a broader programme under the label 'complexity science' or 'complexity economics' (Colander et al., 2010; Rosser 2010) . The complexity approach -arguably the sister discipline of evolutionary economics -has branched into various special strands, in particular into econophysics and econobiology. The generality of the concept has evoked the broad vision of a 'transdisciplinary approach' (Rosser, 2010) .
The toolbox of physics has provided mathematical representations for modelling various kinds of economic phenomena, ranging from laserbased synergy for modelling the emergence of collective preferences, fashion patterns or self-organization in rms (Weidlich, 2000; Haken, 2005) to multi-particle physics for modelling the behaviour of various markets, particularly nancial ones (Schweizer, 2003; Lux and Kaizoji, 2007) , complex regularities of socio-economic networks and collectives (Hollingsworth and Müller, 2008; Sornette, 2008) , and to percolation theory for modelling spatial dynamics (Brenner, 2004) or the di usion of technology under conditions of various consumer demand characteristics (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005a) .
The physics-based models display generally high mathematical abstraction, precision and consistency. To achieve this they use methods that were developed to represent phenomena the complexity of which is lower than that for economic ones. The tools adopted work within a range of empirical assumptions, and importing these tools into economics necessarily means accepting their particular array of assumptions. Accordingly, the need arises to explain what exactly justi es treating physical particles as if they were economic particles with low complexity, and how these then Economics in a cultural key 323 relate to others in the entirety of an economic unit that typically displays features of high complexity. Models of a physico-mathematical nature are premised on a great empirical distance -that between dead matter and economic life -thereby rendering evident the need to justify their empirical content. The methodological crux is this: the empirical distance is great, making the problem large; and, simply because it is large, solutions with regard to vindicating it become di cult. The size of the problem paralleled by the ensuing di culty to solve it may well represent a major limitation on the development of physics-based economics into an empirically attractive variant.
BIOLOGY: PARADIGMATIC SIGNPOST AND TOOLS FOR ECONOMICS
The proximity of biology and economics -both deal with living systems -has inspired economists in two fundamental ways. First of all, biology has served as paradigmatic orientation in a world ruled by mechanics. The founding fathers of the discipline, particularly Veblen and Marshall, entertained the vision of economics as a science drawing deep inspiration from biology (Veblen, 1898; Marshall, 1890) . The two great precursors held quite di erent views about how economics should be reconstructed, but they were united in what they were against: the mechanics of neoclassical economics. Biology may provide paradigmatic guidance for economics in terms of both its static and its dynamic problems. Concerning economic statics (de ned as the logic of coordination), biology provides a paradigmatic pillar in the form of the living system approach as, for instance, universalized into 'general system theory' by Ludwig von Bertalan y (Bertalan y, 1968; Kapp, 1976) . The historical dynamic of that system, as its second pillar, is captured by the concepts of ontogeny and phylogeny. The common denominator is biological knowledge, say G. In a state of ontogeny, an organism performs life-maintaining operations on the basis of a given G. In phylogeny, G changes over time. Gottfried Leibniz, an early discoverer of evolution, spoke -dissenting from Isaac Newton's continuity of equilibrium -of a continuity of change (Leibniz, 1714 (Leibniz, [1991 , calling it 'Continuity Principle'; Öser, 1974; also Witt, 2004) .
The pre x 'biological' in knowledge can, like a constant in mathematics, readily be dropped, and then we get a universal concept of knowledge and of operation. Applied to economics, this means that we have two major levels of theoretical analysis:
• operational level: ongoing operations based on given knowledge.
• knowledge level: structure and evolution of knowledge governing operations.
Evolutionary economics deals with the structure and evolution of knowledge for economic operations. Neoclassical economics analyses ongoing economic operations under the assumption of given knowledge. Biology is useful as more than just a paradigmatic signpost; it also renders practical services. Like physics, it provides a toolbox incorporating modelling techniques, mathematical representations and statistical procedures. Applying this toolbox, a range of conceptual, theoretical and simulation models have been devised, including genetic algorithm and genetic computing (Alander, 2009) , game-theoretic models and replicator dynamics (Gintis, 2009) , evolutionary growth and percolation models (Kwasnicka and Kwasnicki, 2006; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005b) and tness landscape models (Frenken, 2006) . These models shed light on the richness of life in economics in a mathematical form borrowed from biology.
The issue, again, is whether the mathematical representations adequately portray the complexity that is characteristic of economic phenomena. The complexity of life is closer to that of economic phenomena than dead matter, but there is still an empirical distance to be justi ed (Windrum et al., 2007; Geisendorf, 2007; Foray and Steinmueller, 2001 ). For instance, genetic algorithm and genetic computing models posit knowledge in terms of algorithms, prompting questions about the extent to which a completely determined technical sequence can capture evolution; Stuart Kaufmann's 'NK tness landscapes' depict biological environments, inviting the question as to whether or in what way these portray characteristics of economic landscapes with complementary-de ned structures anchored in the division of labour and knowledge; and replicator models dealing with genetic knowledge transmission call for clari cation as to whether or how empirically meaningful economic knowledge transmission is without considering the behavioural key concept of adoption upon which all communication is premised.
Biology-based models, like physics-based models, require an explanation as to why biological phenomena, such as genes, organisms, replication or selection, should represent the complexity of economic phenomena. There has been an extensive discussion revolving around 'universal Darwinism', a concept introduced by biologist-philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995) . It got a warm reception from some economists (Hodgson, 2002; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006; Aldrich et al., 2008) , but little approval from others, who criticized either the weak evidence Economics in a cultural key 325 of homologies, or the irrelevance of its questions (Levit et al., 2010; Witt, 2008 Witt, , 2004 Nelson, 2006; Cordes, 2006; Vromen, 2007) , or the lack of integration of other relevant concepts such as self-organization (Geisendorf, 2009; Buenstorf, 2006) . It must su ce here to conclude with a general assessment: the discussion has furnished little in the way of systematic practical criteria to evaluate the question of whether, or to what extent, it is warranted to apply biological models or representations to a clearly de ned class of economic cases.
The di culties with establishing systematic procedures have led some economists to discard a transdisciplinary perspective altogether. Nelson and Winter, whose work has set the pace for much of the signi cant debate in the last three decades, have pointed out that they generally start with theoretical propositions and use any tools or language that are t for a particular purpose of economic theorizing. Unlike advocates of universal Darwinism, they contend (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 11) : 'We emphatically disavow any intention to pursue biological analogies for their own sake, or even for the sake of progress toward an abstract, higher-level evolutionary theory'. Stanley Metcalfe takes the same course when he asserts (Metcalfe, 2005, p. 392 ) that the various evolutionary concepts employed in economics, 'have nothing inherently to do with biology and related disciplines'.
Indeed, why should one rule out the use of methods, analytical models or mathematical representations if they are useful in economics but lack empirical corroboration in biology? Universal Darwinism cannot set the theoretical agenda of economics. To state that self-generated change and selection are important in economics means preaching to the converted, and to investigate whether or not Darwinian principles hold in physics as they do in biology is, though intellectually highly fascinating, of no great concern for economists. The assessment reached from a practical vantage point is this: encountering universal Darwinism with agnosticism not only allows us to retain the precious legacy of Darwin's work, it also opens up biology as a rich eld for economists, ranging from Ludwig von Bertalan y's grand general system theory to more recent (neo-Lamarckian) approaches involving epigenetics, which explain the adoption of information -the core of a communication-based evolutionary behavioural economics -in a way that Darwinism does not (Knottenbauer, 2009). 14.6 ECONOMICS AS CULTURAL SCIENCE Economics belongs to the cultural level of the evolved natural hierarchy of complexity. In order to acknowledge the complexity of economic phenomena it is necessary to state them in terms of the complexity of that level.
Looking at the research that has been carried out in evolutionary economics, it is clear that there have been few e orts to confront the problem head-on. The main reason for this reluctance to do so may lie in the difculties inherent in devising methods, mathematical representation and statistical tools adequate to cope with the level of complexity that the cultural level expounds. In the approach to economic complexity, recourse has been had -as has been pointed out -to lower levels of complexity 'as if' they were the levels that economic phenomena displayed. I am proposing that, if economics is to be empirically meaningful, the starting point of any theoretical endeavour has to be the cultural level, not the physical or biological level. Based on this theoretical premise, any tool may be chosen that renders adequate service.
While there is no broad discourse on economics as a cultural science, some groundwork has been forthcoming from the evolutionary camp. Though still scanty, it may well provide a rough skeleton of a future theoretical agenda setting the pace for further developments. The research includes works by Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (2010), Jason Potts (2008), Richard R. Nelson (2008) , Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop (2011) and Michael Hutter and David Throsby (2008) .
The domain of human culture comprises two major constituencies: Homo sapiens and cultural artefacts. Captured in their essentials, both are carriers of cultural knowledge: Homo sapiens of subjective (subject-related) knowledge and cultural artefacts of objective (objectrelated) knowledge. This nucleic view of the cultural level yields a classi cation that is, in many and important ways, useful for economic theory construction and modelling. It distinguishes between carrier and knowledge on the one hand, and between subjects and objects on the other.
Cultural knowledge is used in various cultural contexts. The specicity of and di erences between cultural contexts are de ned by the kinds of operations that are performed. In this way, economics is de ned as the discipline dealing with the cultural context governing economic operations. Economic operations include production, consumption and transaction. This insight starts to put some esh on the bones of the earlier distinction of the knowledge level and the operational level, specifying the former as cultural knowledge and the latter as economic operations. Cultural knowledge becomes economically relevant -that is, economic knowledge -when used in the context of economic operations.
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HOMO SAPIENS OECONOMICUS
Homo sapiens and cultural artefacts thus acquire particular meanings in the economic context. Homo sapiens -in his economic operations -gets speci ed as a particular disciplinary construal: Homo sapiens oeconomicus (HSO; Dopfer, 2004) . Seizing upon this concept, various speci cations may be allowed for, depending on the faculties required for particular problem solving in economic environments. Essentially, HSO operates in an economic environment that embraces highly complex structures and is subject to continuous novelty-driven change. HSO, accordingly, may be seen as a 'complex individual', coping with problems of structural complexity (Davis, 2008 (Davis, , 2003 , or as 'Homo creativus', meeting the challenges of unpredictable qualitative change in economic environments (Foster, 1987) . The former construal may prove particularly useful as an assumption for complexity models, the latter as an assumption for evolutionary models.
Other primates create culture, but Homo sapiens -and, for that matter, HSO -excels in three fundamental ways. First, man is a knowledge maker. This faculty unfolds as a process the characteristics of which may be captured by a trajectory that is composed of three phases:
• Phase 1: origination of knowledge.
• Phase 2: adoption of knowledge (perception, understanding, learning).
• Phase 3: retention of knowledge for ongoing economic operations.
Second, Homo sapiens can combine di erent pieces of knowledge into a whole. This faculty is exercised not only on the basis of reacting to environmental conditions but also on that of imagination independent of those external conditions. The cognitive autonomy enables complex knowledge anticipation. Third, humans can share their imagination. Symbolic language is a powerful tool for doing so. Shared imagination, as it unfolds in the process of the generation, adoption and retention of knowledge, lies at the heart of economic evolution.
MATERIAL CULTURE IN ECONOMICS
With Homo sapiens, cultural objects acquire their operational meaning when posited in an economic context. Operationally speci ed, these represent commodities, products or goods, or similarly operationally speci ed objects.
By way of an exemplar, archaeologists are excavating objects at a site that furnishes a record of material culture. They apply methods of stratication, which highlight the history of objects, and of geographic information systems (GISs) and related techniques, which place the ndings in their spatial context. The material account is visible, measurable and quanti able, but in itself says nothing about the rationale of the organization of the objects and about their operational use. Although archaeologists agree widely on the usefulness of modern strati cation methods, the GISs and related techniques, they are split in their views as to whether or in what way it should be of concern to an archaeologist to give meaning to the objects or, instead, simply to leave them as material witnesses untouched by hermeneutic endeavours.
For the present analysis, it is particularly interesting that e orts have been under way to construct the discipline as evolutionary archaeology employing explanatory schemes from biology, such as Darwinism. These attempts have been challenged on the grounds that the explanations were based on wrong analogies to biology -though, in this process, they have left in limbo the principal question, as to whether or how to explain the material record in general. Starting from the cultural (rather than the biological) level, an approach has been suggested that relates cultural artefacts to human cognition, highlighting the co-evolution of objects and cognition (van der Leeuw and McGlade, 1997) . This new kind of complexity-based evolutionary archaeology takes as its departure point the cultural level. It employs principles from biology, such as Darwinian selection, whenever they t a particular explanatory purpose; but it does not construct archaeology from biology. Given this cultural platform, operational economic contexts may be identi ed, and the discipline of economics may be given a systematic home in archaeology. Complexity-based evolutionary archaeology, in turn, would seem to be the most natural home for evolutionary economics, which generally emphasizes long-run views and empirical evidence.
In neoclassical economics, cultural objects have no qualitative attributes. It makes for the universality of the demand and supply model in its partial and general equilibrium variants that it abstracts from any characteristics. Qualitative di erences between commodities are translated into quantitative di erences stated in price ratios of commodities. Heterogeneity turns into homogeneity. The neoclassical model operates not only with the assumption of a representative agent but alsosigni cantly -with that of a representative commodity.
In contrast, evolutionary complexity economics works with both heterogeneous agents and heterogeneous commodities. Admittedly, there are types of multi-agent models that work with heterogeneous agents but retain the assumption of homogeneous commodities, as when analysing the sh market of Marseilles (Kirman and Vignes, 1991) . Although these models shed light on market equilibrium under the condition of a single kind of commodity, such as stocks, or indeed sh, they fail to provide new insights when there are many di erent kinds of commodities. In the case of the economy as a whole (or an equivalent macro context), when, typically, many markets connect qualitatively in complementarities, the assumption of heterogeneous commodities is mandatory. As with an excavation site in archaeology, an economy is composed of heterogeneous objects, and constructing the whole can be accomplished only by putting together the pieces with all their distinct attributes.
BIMODAL METHODOLOGY
Economic operations are anchored in knowledge. An understanding of the nature of structure and the evolution of knowledge is therefore the key to an understanding of economic operations. A clear analytical exposition of this concept would therefore appear to represent a sensible starting point for the construction of an economic theory or model.
In its archetypical form, knowledge may be seen as representing a knowledge-bit. This elementary analytical unit has two essential properties. On the one hand, it is an idea; it embodies semantic content. As idea, it is timeless and spaceless. On the other hand, ideas do not reside in a Platonic heaven, but are always physically actualized; they have a carrier. Ideas are actualized by matter and energy in time and space. The knowledge-bit therefore typically possesses -ontologically -a bimodal nature (Dopfer and Potts, 2008) .
Acknowledging this ontologically anchored characteristic has important implications for the way methodology is approached. Ideas are not observable. They cannot be measured with a metre rule but, instead, have to be interpreted in terms of their meaning -for example, as function or task. The appropriate procedure for coping with qualitative attributes, such as product or technological characteristics, is hermeneutics. In turn, knowledge in its physical actualization is observable. It can be measured on a metric scale and quanti ed. Its methodology is statistics and other such quantitative measurement.
Conceiving the elementary unit of the knowledge-bit in the entirety of its properties calls for recognition of both quality and quantity: for a bimodal methodology. A monomodal methodology aims either at only a qualitative empirical account or at only a quantitative one. It would be a mistake to associate traditional economics with quanti cation and distinguish it from evolutionary and complexity economics as an approach that deals only 330 The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology with qualitative analysis. The di erence is that the latter strand is premised on concepts such as technological heterogeneity or product characteristics, conducting quanti cation in recognition of these qualitative attributes. Traditional economics lacks any such hermeneutic guidance. It is therefore good at aggregation (notwithstanding the well-known problems that accompany it), but fails entirely in accounting for structure. Evolutionary economics retains qualitative attributes and, rather than rejecting any aggregation, it performs it in recognition of the qualitatively structured data.
FROM MICRO TO MACRO
The knowledge approach stands in close kinship with the system approach. A system may be de ned as relations between component parts, and knowledge, if conceived of in a very generalized manner, de nes both. In this way, the economy as a knowledge-de ned macro-system is composed of interrelated knowledge-de ned micro-systems.
In simple models, the micro units are treated like physical particles (rather than systems) with xed behavioural propensities. Complex models, in turn, treat the micro units themselves as systems, and, as a consequence, the macro-system of the economy is composed of interrelated micro-systems. There is a system hierarchy, with an upper level consisting of the total system and a lower level of multiple subsystems. Coping with the intricacies of system hierarchy poses major challenges for complexity science and complexity economics (Lane, 2006) .
The analytical problems are compounded when dealing with several levels. Given a continuum of levels, the complexity in the analysis may be reduced by keeping the component parts simple, for instance, as in the mentioned case, by working with non-systemic micro units. Heading in the opposite direction, higher levels may be accounted for by specifying the micro unit, for instance by allowing for HSO in his systemic or similar characteristics. A theory of the rm may thus work with either a simple or a complex model of HSO. Viewed from the angle of its 'micro-micro' assumptions, it will be either a simple or a complex theory of the rm (Leibenstein, 1976a (Leibenstein, , 1976b Frantz, 1986 Frantz, , 1997 14.11 COMPLEXITY MEETS EVOLUTION: MESO Looking at the economy through the lens of complexity science, we see it as system. Accordingly, the analytical focus here is on aspects such as hierarchy, structure, relations and complementariness. In this way it is, Economics in a cultural key 331 basically, a static view. The further question, then, is this: how does the macro-system move in time? How does the economy as complex system evolve?
We get a rst clue when recalling that the micro unit is involved in the process of the generation, adoption and retention of knowledge. Change occurs in the form of a micro trajectory actualized within the boundaries of a subsystem -for example a rm. Since the novel knowledge variant introduces a novel component into an extant structure, structural change takes place. This is an important result; and it is here, where complexitybased analysis usually ends, that evolutionary economics steps in.
From an evolutionary angle, the micro units are, in their processdynamic, not closed but open systems. Novel knowledge variants cross the boundaries of the generating carrier, 'spilling over' into the environment. Knowledge is encoded and decoded by carriers, and transmitted by communication.
The hallmark of the bimodality assumption is that a single knowledgebit can be actualized many times. It can be actualized not just by a single carrier but by many carriers; for instance a technology can be adopted by many rms. A single actualization of a knowledge-bit may be possible, but it would be a special case, as opposed to the general case of many actualizations. Complexity economics, reduced to its essentials, assumes a special case to be the general one. Introducing the evolutionary perspective, the analytical unit for the construction of an evolutionary macro is not a single knowledge-bit (a single idea, a single actualization) but, rather, a single idea and many carriers actualizing it. The analytical unit is one knowledge-bit and many actualizations. Evolutionary complexity expounds as both 'one-ness' and 'many-ness'.
This leads us to a theoretical architecture of economics in which the received micro-macro dichotomy collapses. 'Micro' is a member of a population, and it is not the micro unit but, rather, a population of them that is the component part of 'macro'. One may circumvent the population by heading directly from micro to macro, but this represents a valid procedure only if one is dealing with the uniform single-actualization case or if the aim is to ignore the aspects of process altogether.
As it is neither micro nor macro, there is a gap in our terminology. Recognizing the intermediate nature of this analytical unit, we may call it, without challenging our vocabulary excessively, 'meso'. The upshot of the meso unit is the duality of its de ning characteristics: it is a structure component and a process component. It is a structure component in that it connects as single knowledge-content or idea with others (section 14.13), and a process component in that it expounds the logic of its physical actualization in time and space (section 14.14).
ARCHITECTURE: MICRO-MESO-MACRO
The architecture of an evolutionary complexity-based economics is starting to take shape. Its constituent domains are these: micro, meso and macro. The major building block from which macro is constructed is meso. The construction work can start by specifying what the two constituencies of knowledge consist of: knowledge content and actualization process. Constructing macro from knowledge content, we get structure in its semantic characteristics, as ideas; let us call it the 'deep' macro structure. Constructing macro from actualization processes, we obtain an observable structure as it unfolds along the trajectories of the generation, adoption and retention of knowledge; we may call this the 'surface' macro structure.
INVESTIGATING STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY
Knowledge content may come in two guises: as a single knowledge-bit or as a structured knowledge composite actualized in a carrier. Depending on which one we choose as our assumption, we will get quite di erent models. On the one hand, a meso model may be constructed by turning to the composite knowledge actualized in a carrier -for example a rm. A meso population is then composed of many carriers, such as rms. The macro is construed analogously, from a composite of carrier-de ned meso units. It represents the visible surface structure of macro. Most current strands, such as multi-agent models and industrial sector dynamic models, operate on the basis of carriers or agents. In models of the former type the theoretical speci cation of meso does not play an essential role (Tefsatsion, 2002) , but it is a constituent aspect in the latter (Pyka et al., 2006; Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007; Castellacci, 2009) .
On the other hand, meso may be viewed as being composed of single knowledge-bits, such as a technology. Unlike in the preceding case, the meso population is now not composed of carriers but, rather, of actualizations of a single knowledge-bit. In this way, for instance, a single technology has a population of actualizations. Models that operate upon single knowledge-bits (rather than carriers) include learning, selective adoption and path-dependent models, as addressed in the following section.
Employing knowledge-bits as the building block, macro emerges as a deep knowledge structure or division of knowledge. The methodological cornerstone of this analysis is mereology. Though not conducted under this label, there is a body of literature (scanty as it is) that explicitly Economics in a cultural key 333 recognizes its theoretical signi cance (Helmstädter, 2003; Langlois, 2002; Antonelli, 2008) . By way of an example, producing a car requires the assembly of various components that stand in complementariness to each other. In contrast, a carrier-based composite approach allows us only to analyse interdependences stated in terms of inputs and outputs -for instance, as a Leontief inverse matrix. Neither the input mix nor the output end result provides any information as to how the component parts are combined. As can be seen, therefore, the conventional composite approach fails to serve as an appropriate basis for depicting the 'deep' structure of knowledge in an economy.
Micro knowledge-bits or carriers may be assembled into a subsystem; or, similarly, a game-theoretic social context may be singled out for partial analysis (Elsner, 2010; Hayden, 2008) . In this way, a further level (besides micro and macro) in the continuum of levels of the system hierarchy may be introduced. Analogously, a level of sub-aggregates in a continuum marked by micro (no aggregation) and macro (total aggregation) may be allowed for. Assuming a single (systemic, aggregation) level, it will show up as an intermediate level, and the label 'meso' may be assigned to it. Introducing further levels in the continuum, a sequence of meso levels will result -say, meso 1, meso 2, meso 3 and so on; this is not a satisfactory analytical result.
Within the present framework, for an analytical unit to qualify as meso, two conditions have to be met. On the one hand, the construal must be identi ed as a component part of a structure. It is inessential that the structure component itself expounds structural features (though this assumption is consistent with the concept). On the other hand, the structure component must be stated in terms of a process dealing with the generation, selective adoption and retention of knowledge. Although in-depth system analysis, game theory or di erentiated aggregation procedures are themselves useful, they fail to provide essential cues for a theoretical construction of an evolving macro structure unless they explicate its role as structure component and, as is shown subsequently, as process component.
14.14 THE EVOLUTIONARY CORE While a systemic account focuses on the synchronic aspects of an economy, evolutionary analysis aims at an enquiry into its diachronic aspects. Dealing in the following with the latter, meso -as building block for macro -needs to be identi ed as a process component. Until this juncture, change has been viewed as occurring within micro -for example 334 The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology a rm -representing its dynamic as a micro trajectory. This concept may serve as a blueprint for dealing with the meso dynamic -with the only, albeit essential, di erence relating to adoption. In the rst phase the two concepts match, but in the second phase (dealing with the adoption of knowledge) the distinction is between microscopic and macroscopicor 'mesoscopic' -adoption. Again, the trajectory may be construed by employing either a single carrier or a single knowledge-bit actualized in distinct populations.
As a master model, the meso trajectory looks as follows:
1. Origination of new knowledge. 2. Macroscopic adoption of new knowledge. 3. Retention of new knowledge.
An enormous amount of work has been done on the various aspects of the trajectory dynamic. In the most recent work, a trend may be observed away from the analysis of 'isolated trajectories' towards looking at 'embedded trajectories', which work out their dynamic in a structured or network environment (Potts, 2000) . With regard to the rst phase, novelty generation, though usually considered the engine of economic growth, is still for the most part an underresearched topic (Witt, 2009; Grebel, 2009; Encinar and Muñoz, 2006 ). An intriguing aspect concerns the complex dynamic relationship between structural complementariness and the generation of novelty, as captured by the concept of 'generative relationship' and micro-meso-macro innovation clusters (Lane and Max eld, 2005; Brette and Mehier, 2008) .
There is a vast literature related to the second phase, the di usion and macroscopic adoption of knowledge. The work embraces broadly conceived di usion models (Buenstor and Klepper, 2009; Klepper, 1997) , selection models (van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2009; Knudsen, 2002) , path-dependence and network life cycle models (David, 2005; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Arthur, 2009; Pyka, 2000) and learning and networking models (Dosi et al., 2005) . These models address di erent aspects of the meso dynamic, but they all share the feature of conceiving it in a structured environment or network.
The third phase embraces the elds of habits, skills and routines and, in general, the eld of institutions. The literature on these topics has expanded ever since the publication of the seminal 1982 contribution by Nelson and Winter (Lazaric and Raybaut, 2005; Becker, 2008) . Further developments may be expected along the line of the original strands of American institutionalism -a theoretical potential that is far from being exhausted (Nelson, 2008; Hodgson, 2007; Nelson and Nelson, 2002). 14.15 LOOKING TO THE FUTURE Schumpeter remarked 100 years ago that economic statics was already well developed and that what was therefore needed was the development of an economic dynamics. Developments in the discipline took a di erent course, however. The theoretical e orts of the last 100 years or so have resulted in a monumental edi ce of economic statics, lacking anything comparable on the side of economic dynamics. The exceptions were (besides Schumpeter's own contribution) the various post-war economic growth theories. While these theories, particularly in their vintage as endogenous growth theories and post-Keynesian models, have furnished important insights, they are built on premises that make it difcult to address economic growth as an endogenously self-generating, self-adapting and continuously self-restructuring process.
A theory conducive to coping with this core problem requires the introduction of a vehicle that allows us to deal with both process and structure. Since structure and process are not isolated but, rather, two sides of a single phenomenon, the meso vehicle would seem to render a useful service in tackling this problem. Although the construction of macro along these lines is still in its infancy, interesting work has already been forthcoming in terms of addressing economic growth as a self-generating process in its causal nexus with a continuous restructuring of the economy (Metcalfe et al., 2006; Pyka, 2004, 2008; Cantner and Krüger, 2008; Malerba, 2006; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005a) .
Further groundwork will be needed to secure the sustainability of this theoretical course. This will include, on the one hand, further theoretical work on the basic relationship between the levels of micro, meso and macro, as well as on taxonomies relating to the various kinds of knowledge and of carriers. Work on the micro-meso-macro architecture may be advanced in various ways such as, for instance, by adopting a uni ed rule approach that advances taxonomy and the theoretical exposition on the basis of the concept of (complex and evolving) generic rules (Dopfer and Potts, 2008; Dopfer, 2005; Dopfer et al., 2004) . Further groundwork is needed, on the other hand, concerning the methods for empirical research. Enquiring into complex evolving systems requires both quanti cation and hermeneutic methods. These methods apply to empirical data that at any one time have a structure, calling for a Linnean type of taxonomy, and that over time are continuously changing, calling for a Darwinian type of taxonomy. Cladistic and related taxonomies have emerged as a way of reconciling the demands of structural complexity and evolution when charting empirical data (Allen, 2005; Andersen, 2008; Cantner and Pyka, 2001) . Scienti c advances will be made in the future in this new camp -as 336 The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology they will, arguably, in much of science -along a co-evolutionary path, with theory, method and empirical work receiving their appropriate share of the recognition.
